More than one sign-in in three, without a password
On 15 October 2026 the FIDO Alliance, the industry consortium that wrote the passkey standard, published its Passkey Index 2026.1 It is built on data from 15 major services, including Amazon, Google, Microsoft, PayPal, WhatsApp, TikTok and the American bank JP Morgan Chase. On average, 36% of successful sign-ins now use a passkey. A year earlier the figure was 26%, though from a group of nine companies, so the comparison is only indicative.
Passkey sign-ins succeed 93% of the time, against 78% for passwords with codes sent by text message or app. They are almost three times faster and save an average of 27 seconds per sign-in. All eight participants that measure phishing have seen fewer successful attacks since they introduced passkeys. The same association estimates that 7 billion passkeys are in use worldwide.2
The data were supplied anonymously to an association that promotes the standard, but they were measured on real services, not in a lab.
What a passkey is
A passkey replaces the password with a pair of cryptographic keys that your phone or computer creates when you sign up to a site. The public key goes to the site, which keeps it like a padlock: it is not a secret, and stealing it achieves nothing. The private key stays on the device, or in the encrypted keychain that syncs it, and the site never sees it.3 When you sign in, the site sends a challenge, the device signs it with the private key and the site checks the signature against the padlock it already holds. To authorise the signature you use whatever unlocks your phone, a fingerprint, your face or a PIN, which do not leave the device either.
Then comes the most important detail. Each passkey is tied to the address of the site it was created for, and the browser only uses it there. A fake page imitating your bank, however perfect, has a different address, and the phone simply does not answer it. When the W3C made WebAuthn, the technology passkeys are built on, an official web standard in March 2019, it wrote that this model eliminates the risks of phishing and all forms of password theft.4 In May 2022 Apple, Google and Microsoft committed to supporting it together, and passkeys synced across devices grew out of that.5
Why a password and a code are no longer enough
For years the answer to stolen passwords was two-step verification: the password plus a code by text message or an approval in an app. It works against automated attacks, much less against well-made phishing. In 2019 Google, with New York University and the University of California San Diego, measured how much each check blocks. A text message code stopped 100% of bots but only 76% of targeted attacks; an on-device prompt stopped 90%. Among people who used only physical security keys, built on the same family of standards as passkeys, none fell for targeted phishing.6
Targeted attacks stopped, by type of second check
The reason is that a fake page can ask for the code and use it at the same moment. In 2022 Microsoft described a campaign that placed a site between the victim and the real service and had targeted more than 10,000 organisations since September 2021, stealing passwords and open sessions.7 The guidelines of NIST, the American standards body, rewritten in July 2025, are explicit: passwords, one-time codes and approvals sent to another device are not phishing-resistant. Only cryptographic methods bound to the site, such as WebAuthn, are.8
In Verizon's Data Breach Investigations Report, which in 2026 analysed more than 22,000 data breaches, stolen credentials were the way in for 13% of cases and phishing for 16%, behind software vulnerabilities, at 31%. In simulations, people click on messages arriving by text or phone call 40% more often than on emails.9 And looking at the whole attack chain rather than just the first step, stolen credentials appear in 39% of breaches.10
In Italy: SPID, the CIE card and phishing about refunds
In 2025 Italy's Polizia Postale, the police unit for cybercrime, handled 27,085 proceedings for economic and financial cybercrime, with more than 269 million euros taken, and its online reporting office received more than 32,000 phishing reports.11 The scams, the report says, mostly start from emails, calls and text messages that appear to come from ministries, public bodies or banks, and they are after passwords and one-time codes. CERT-AgID, which tracks attacks on Italy's public administration, counted 1,922 phishing campaigns in 2025, 328 of them using PagoPA, the public payments platform, as bait.12
In Italy the most common way into public services is SPID, the national digital identity. On 31 January 2026 there were 42,158,197 active SPID identities, more than 70% of them managed by Poste Italiane.13 Level 2, the one used almost all the time, asks for the password plus an approval in the PosteID app or a text message code.14 That is exactly the pattern NIST does not consider phishing-resistant. Level 1 and 2 credentials for the electronic identity card, the CIE, work the same way, with a password and a one-time code or QR code.15
Level 3 of the CIE is different. To sign in you hold the card against a phone with NFC, or a reader, and type the PIN.15 Someone who tricks you into giving the PIN on a fake page still does not have the card. On 1 November the Interior Ministry counted 67.6 million cards issued; as of 30 September, however, only 14.7 million people had used one to sign in online in the previous twelve months.16 As of 1 November, the official CIE and PosteID pages do not list passkeys among the ways to sign in.
What a fake page can steal
| Sign-in method | What you type or approve | Phishing-resistant |
|---|---|---|
| Password | A secret word, always the same | No: whoever collects it reuses it |
| Password and text message code | The password and a code valid for minutes | No: the fake page uses them at once |
| Password and app approval (SPID level 2) | The password and an approval on the phone | No: you unknowingly approve someone else's sign-in |
| CIE with the card (level 3) | The PIN, while the phone reads the card | Much better: without the card the PIN is not enough |
| Passkey | Fingerprint, face or PIN, which stay on the phone | Yes: the key only works on the right site |
One problem lies beyond the reach of any sign-in method. In April 2025 the Italian consumer association Altroconsumo described the "double SPID" scam: with a stolen identity document, often obtained through text messages pretending to come from INPS, the national pensions agency, someone activates a second SPID identity with a different email and phone number and changes the IBAN for pensions and refunds on the INPS and tax agency portals. The first SPID stays active and its owner receives no warning.17
What happens if you lose your phone
The answer depends on where the passkey is stored. Almost always it sits in a manager that syncs it with end-to-end encryption: iCloud Keychain on iPhone and Mac, Google Password Manager on Android and Chrome. If you lose the phone, your passkeys stay on your other devices and come back on the new one.
Apple lets you recover them even if you lose every device, with your account password, a text message to the registered number and the passcode of a device you used before. You can also name a recovery contact, a trusted person who helps you get back in.3 Google, on a new device, asks for the Google Password Manager PIN or the screen lock of an old Android phone, and says that not even the company can read the passkeys you save.18
With PosteID, open sessions can be closed from the personal area on posteid.poste.it.14 The CIE, on the other hand, does not live in the phone, and with another NFC smartphone and the CieID app you can get back in. If it is the card that goes missing, it has to be reported to the police, and its revocation line is 800 098558.16
The real risk is the plan B. If a site keeps accepting the password or a text message code, a scammer will try to get in that way. The Passkey Index admits as much: two participants show a password or code before offering the passkey, even to users who have one, and one of them estimates that reversing the order would roughly double its passkey sign-ins. Nine of the thirteen participants that answered plan to offer passwordless accounts within twelve months.1
One reasonable doubt remains. Keeping everything in Apple's or Google's keychain ties you to them even more, a risk I wrote about in Who holds the keys?. The dependence does not go away, but at least you can now switch managers: since iOS 26 passkeys move from one app to another using a format defined with the members of the FIDO Alliance, without writing readable files to disk.19
What I think
For an ordinary person, passkeys are the most useful security change of the past ten years, and they cost nothing. They take away what phishing is after and make signing in quicker at the same time, which is rare in security.
I do not see them as a complete solution, though. A passkey protects the front door, and attacks move to wherever protection is missing: account recovery, the text message code left as a fallback, the identity issued in someone else's name. Double SPID is one example.
On public services I am firmer. Since May 2025 Microsoft has created new accounts without a password.20 For pensions, refunds and health records the Italian state still relies mostly on passwords and approvals that NIST considers possible to get around, while the CIE read by a phone is already a physical key in the hands of millions of people. I think it should become mandatory for the most sensitive operations, starting with changing an IBAN, and that SPID should accept passkeys, as the large private services already do.
How to switch to passkeys
- EmailYour inbox firstCreate a passkey for your Google, Apple or Microsoft email account: whoever controls it can reset almost everything else. For Google: myaccount.google.com/signinoptions/passkeys.
- AccountsThen the services that matterLook for "Passkey" in the security settings of Amazon, PayPal, WhatsApp and the other services you use most. passkeys.directory lists who offers them.
- BackupA solid plan BPasskeys in a synced manager or on two devices, an up-to-date recovery email and number, a recovery contact on Apple or the Password Manager PIN on Google.
- StateThe CIE for sensitive thingsIn Italy, set up the CieID app with the card, keep the PIN and PUK away from the phone and check now and then the IBAN registered with INPS and the tax agency.
One last piece of advice applies even if you do not have a passkey yet. An approval request in your banking app or in PosteID only arrives if someone is using your password. If you are not signing in yourself, right then, at an address you typed by hand, reject it and change the password straight away.