“Sooner than expected” · Security

Goodbye passwords? What passkeys are and why they now work

One sign-in in three to major online services already uses a passkey. How it works, why it resists phishing, where Italy's SPID and CIE stand, what happens if you lose your phone.

Line drawing: a smartphone with a black key on its screen and the sign of a fingerprint; beside it, a fishing hook pulls up only a paper note with a password hidden behind dots.
With a passkey the secret stays in the phone: a phisher can only take away what we type ourselves.

Listen to the episode

Podcast episode in Italian · 10 min. The voice is mine, recreated with artificial intelligence.

In short

  • According to the FIDO Alliance's Passkey Index, published on 15 October, 36% of successful sign-ins to 15 major services use a passkey; those sign-ins succeed 93% of the time, against 78% for passwords and codes.
  • A passkey is tied to the site it was made for, so a fake page cannot use it. In Italy, level 2 SPID still relies on passwords and approvals that NIST does not consider phishing-resistant; the CIE identity card read by the phone is the closest alternative.
  • If you lose your phone, synced passkeys come back on the new device. The weak spot is still account recovery and the password left as a plan B.

More than one sign-in in three, without a password

On 15 October 2026 the FIDO Alliance, the industry consortium that wrote the passkey standard, published its Passkey Index 2026.1 It is built on data from 15 major services, including Amazon, Google, Microsoft, PayPal, WhatsApp, TikTok and the American bank JP Morgan Chase. On average, 36% of successful sign-ins now use a passkey. A year earlier the figure was 26%, though from a group of nine companies, so the comparison is only indicative.

Passkey sign-ins succeed 93% of the time, against 78% for passwords with codes sent by text message or app. They are almost three times faster and save an average of 27 seconds per sign-in. All eight participants that measure phishing have seen fewer successful attacks since they introduced passkeys. The same association estimates that 7 billion passkeys are in use worldwide.2

The data were supplied anonymously to an association that promotes the standard, but they were measured on real services, not in a lab.

36%successful sign-ins made with a passkey across the 15 services in the Passkey IndexFIDO Alliance, October 2026
93%passkey sign-ins that succeed. With passwords and codes, 78%FIDO Alliance, October 2026
7 billionpasskeys in use worldwide, by the association's estimateFIDO Alliance, October 2026
Over 32,000phishing reports received in 2025 by the Italian police's online reporting officePolizia Postale, January 2026

What a passkey is

A passkey replaces the password with a pair of cryptographic keys that your phone or computer creates when you sign up to a site. The public key goes to the site, which keeps it like a padlock: it is not a secret, and stealing it achieves nothing. The private key stays on the device, or in the encrypted keychain that syncs it, and the site never sees it.3 When you sign in, the site sends a challenge, the device signs it with the private key and the site checks the signature against the padlock it already holds. To authorise the signature you use whatever unlocks your phone, a fingerprint, your face or a PIN, which do not leave the device either.

Then comes the most important detail. Each passkey is tied to the address of the site it was created for, and the browser only uses it there. A fake page imitating your bank, however perfect, has a different address, and the phone simply does not answer it. When the W3C made WebAuthn, the technology passkeys are built on, an official web standard in March 2019, it wrote that this model eliminates the risks of phishing and all forms of password theft.4 In May 2022 Apple, Google and Microsoft committed to supporting it together, and passkeys synced across devices grew out of that.5

Why a password and a code are no longer enough

For years the answer to stolen passwords was two-step verification: the password plus a code by text message or an approval in an app. It works against automated attacks, much less against well-made phishing. In 2019 Google, with New York University and the University of California San Diego, measured how much each check blocks. A text message code stopped 100% of bots but only 76% of targeted attacks; an on-device prompt stopped 90%. Among people who used only physical security keys, built on the same family of standards as passkeys, none fell for targeted phishing.6

Targeted attacks stopped, by type of second check

Text message code76%
Prompt on the phone90%
FIDO security keyno victims
Google with New York University and UC San Diego, May 2019. For security keys, Google reports that no user relying on them exclusively fell for targeted phishing during the study.

The reason is that a fake page can ask for the code and use it at the same moment. In 2022 Microsoft described a campaign that placed a site between the victim and the real service and had targeted more than 10,000 organisations since September 2021, stealing passwords and open sessions.7 The guidelines of NIST, the American standards body, rewritten in July 2025, are explicit: passwords, one-time codes and approvals sent to another device are not phishing-resistant. Only cryptographic methods bound to the site, such as WebAuthn, are.8

In Verizon's Data Breach Investigations Report, which in 2026 analysed more than 22,000 data breaches, stolen credentials were the way in for 13% of cases and phishing for 16%, behind software vulnerabilities, at 31%. In simulations, people click on messages arriving by text or phone call 40% more often than on emails.9 And looking at the whole attack chain rather than just the first step, stolen credentials appear in 39% of breaches.10

In Italy: SPID, the CIE card and phishing about refunds

In 2025 Italy's Polizia Postale, the police unit for cybercrime, handled 27,085 proceedings for economic and financial cybercrime, with more than 269 million euros taken, and its online reporting office received more than 32,000 phishing reports.11 The scams, the report says, mostly start from emails, calls and text messages that appear to come from ministries, public bodies or banks, and they are after passwords and one-time codes. CERT-AgID, which tracks attacks on Italy's public administration, counted 1,922 phishing campaigns in 2025, 328 of them using PagoPA, the public payments platform, as bait.12

In Italy the most common way into public services is SPID, the national digital identity. On 31 January 2026 there were 42,158,197 active SPID identities, more than 70% of them managed by Poste Italiane.13 Level 2, the one used almost all the time, asks for the password plus an approval in the PosteID app or a text message code.14 That is exactly the pattern NIST does not consider phishing-resistant. Level 1 and 2 credentials for the electronic identity card, the CIE, work the same way, with a password and a one-time code or QR code.15

Level 3 of the CIE is different. To sign in you hold the card against a phone with NFC, or a reader, and type the PIN.15 Someone who tricks you into giving the PIN on a fake page still does not have the card. On 1 November the Interior Ministry counted 67.6 million cards issued; as of 30 September, however, only 14.7 million people had used one to sign in online in the previous twelve months.16 As of 1 November, the official CIE and PosteID pages do not list passkeys among the ways to sign in.

What a fake page can steal

Sign-in methodWhat you type or approvePhishing-resistant
PasswordA secret word, always the sameNo: whoever collects it reuses it
Password and text message codeThe password and a code valid for minutesNo: the fake page uses them at once
Password and app approval (SPID level 2)The password and an approval on the phoneNo: you unknowingly approve someone else's sign-in
CIE with the card (level 3)The PIN, while the phone reads the cardMuch better: without the card the PIN is not enough
PasskeyFingerprint, face or PIN, which stay on the phoneYes: the key only works on the right site
NIST SP 800-63B-4; Italian Interior Ministry; Poste Italiane; FIDO Alliance.

One problem lies beyond the reach of any sign-in method. In April 2025 the Italian consumer association Altroconsumo described the "double SPID" scam: with a stolen identity document, often obtained through text messages pretending to come from INPS, the national pensions agency, someone activates a second SPID identity with a different email and phone number and changes the IBAN for pensions and refunds on the INPS and tax agency portals. The first SPID stays active and its owner receives no warning.17

What happens if you lose your phone

The answer depends on where the passkey is stored. Almost always it sits in a manager that syncs it with end-to-end encryption: iCloud Keychain on iPhone and Mac, Google Password Manager on Android and Chrome. If you lose the phone, your passkeys stay on your other devices and come back on the new one.

Apple lets you recover them even if you lose every device, with your account password, a text message to the registered number and the passcode of a device you used before. You can also name a recovery contact, a trusted person who helps you get back in.3 Google, on a new device, asks for the Google Password Manager PIN or the screen lock of an old Android phone, and says that not even the company can read the passkeys you save.18

With PosteID, open sessions can be closed from the personal area on posteid.poste.it.14 The CIE, on the other hand, does not live in the phone, and with another NFC smartphone and the CieID app you can get back in. If it is the card that goes missing, it has to be reported to the police, and its revocation line is 800 098558.16

The real risk is the plan B. If a site keeps accepting the password or a text message code, a scammer will try to get in that way. The Passkey Index admits as much: two participants show a password or code before offering the passkey, even to users who have one, and one of them estimates that reversing the order would roughly double its passkey sign-ins. Nine of the thirteen participants that answered plan to offer passwordless accounts within twelve months.1

One reasonable doubt remains. Keeping everything in Apple's or Google's keychain ties you to them even more, a risk I wrote about in Who holds the keys?. The dependence does not go away, but at least you can now switch managers: since iOS 26 passkeys move from one app to another using a format defined with the members of the FIDO Alliance, without writing readable files to disk.19

What I think

For an ordinary person, passkeys are the most useful security change of the past ten years, and they cost nothing. They take away what phishing is after and make signing in quicker at the same time, which is rare in security.

I do not see them as a complete solution, though. A passkey protects the front door, and attacks move to wherever protection is missing: account recovery, the text message code left as a fallback, the identity issued in someone else's name. Double SPID is one example.

On public services I am firmer. Since May 2025 Microsoft has created new accounts without a password.20 For pensions, refunds and health records the Italian state still relies mostly on passwords and approvals that NIST considers possible to get around, while the CIE read by a phone is already a physical key in the hands of millions of people. I think it should become mandatory for the most sensitive operations, starting with changing an IBAN, and that SPID should accept passkeys, as the large private services already do.

How to switch to passkeys

  1. EmailYour inbox firstCreate a passkey for your Google, Apple or Microsoft email account: whoever controls it can reset almost everything else. For Google: myaccount.google.com/signinoptions/passkeys.
  2. AccountsThen the services that matterLook for "Passkey" in the security settings of Amazon, PayPal, WhatsApp and the other services you use most. passkeys.directory lists who offers them.
  3. BackupA solid plan BPasskeys in a synced manager or on two devices, an up-to-date recovery email and number, a recovery contact on Apple or the Password Manager PIN on Google.
  4. StateThe CIE for sensitive thingsIn Italy, set up the CieID app with the card, keep the PIN and PUK away from the phone and check now and then the IBAN registered with INPS and the tax agency.

One last piece of advice applies even if you do not have a passkey yet. An approval request in your banking app or in PosteID only arrives if someone is using your password. If you are not signing in yourself, right then, at an address you typed by hand, reject it and change the password straight away.

Notes and sources

  1. FIDO Alliance, Passkey Index, October 2026 ↗, 15 October 2026. Data from 15 services compiled on 21 September 2026, unweighted averages. Overview: Passkey Index 2026 ↗. ↩
  2. FIDO Alliance, 7 billion passkeys and counting: the next chapter of passwordless authentication ↗, 15 October 2026. ↩
  3. Apple, About the security of passkeys ↗, September 2024. ↩
  4. W3C and FIDO Alliance, W3C and FIDO Alliance Finalize Web Standard for Secure, Passwordless Logins ↗, 4 March 2019. ↩
  5. FIDO Alliance, Apple, Google and Microsoft Commit to Expanded Support for FIDO Standard ↗, 5 May 2022. ↩
  6. K. Thomas, A. Moscicki, Google, New research: How effective is basic account hygiene at preventing hijacking ↗, 17 May 2019. ↩
  7. Microsoft Threat Intelligence, From cookie theft to BEC: Attackers use AiTM phishing sites as entry point to further financial fraud ↗, 12 July 2022. ↩
  8. NIST, SP 800-63B-4, Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Authenticator Management ↗, July 2025. ↩
  9. Verizon, 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report, Executive Summary ↗, May 2026. ↩
  10. Push Security, What the Verizon DBIR tells us about breaches in 2026 ↗, 20 May 2026, with figures from the full report. ↩
  11. Polizia di Stato, 2025 annual report of the Polizia Postale e per la Sicurezza Cibernetica ↗ (in Italian), January 2026. Data consolidated on 21 December 2025. ↩
  12. CERT-AgID, Summary report on the malicious campaigns analysed by CERT-AgID in 2025 ↗ (in Italian), 10 February 2026. ↩
  13. G. Manca, Agenda Digitale, Ten years of SPID: a glorious past, an uncertain future ↗ (in Italian), 6 March 2026, on AgID data. ↩
  14. Poste Italiane, PosteID FAQ ↗ (in Italian), accessed 1 November 2026. ↩
  15. Italian Interior Ministry, The card ↗ and Sign in with CIE, levels 1 and 2 ↗ (in Italian), accessed 1 November 2026. ↩
  16. Italian Interior Ministry, CIE in numbers ↗ (in Italian), data at 30 September 2026; cards issued from the counter on the home page ↗, 1 November 2026. ↩
  17. P. Catucci, Altroconsumo, The double SPID scam: how it works and how to protect yourself ↗ (in Italian), 7 April 2025. ↩
  18. C. Desai, Google, Sync passkeys securely across your devices ↗, 19 September 2024. ↩
  19. Apple, What's new in passkeys ↗, WWDC25, June 2025. ↩
  20. V. Jakkal, J. Chik, Microsoft, Pushing passkeys forward: Microsoft's latest updates for simpler, safer sign-ins ↗, 1 May 2025. ↩